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FINDING THE RIGHT FIT: ONE DESIGN 
ELEMENT IN THE INTERNATIONAL 
GROUNDWATER RESOURCE REGIME 
COALTER G. LATHROP* 
INTRODUCTION 
The international transboundary groundwater resource regime 
will continue to develop as a series of bilateral or regional agreements 
related to specific resource pools often referred to as aquifers or 
aquifer systems.1 Unlike the emerging climate change regime, the 
groundwater regime will not, and need not, become global in scope. 
This prediction will not be surprising for those familiar with the 
spatial distribution and physical attributes of groundwater and the 
concept of territorial sovereignty in the international legal system. 
However, with respect to forests – another resource that is rooted in 
the territory in which it is located – a regime with global scope is 
emerging. Why do we get different answers with respect to regime 
scope for these two quintessentially sovereign resources? 
The reason is straight-forward: the externalities – both positive 
and negative – associated with groundwater are spatially bounded, 
albeit on a continental scale, while some of the externalities 
associated with forests are not since their spillover effects can be 
global.2 Put another way, the goods and services associated with 
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 1. Among the questions put to the panel on water issues at the Duke Journal of 
Comparative & International Law Symposium titled Local Property, Global Justice: Law and 
Resources in the Era of Climate Change was this one: “Will water rights issues continue to 
develop as agreements between neighboring countries, or do we need a more global vision?” I 
understand this to be, primarily, a question about regime design, in particular the number and 
identity of the actors that should be involved. 
 2. Breyer uses some of these terms in the context of describing rationales for regulation: 
“The differences between true social costs and unregulated price are ‘spillover’ costs (or 
benefits) – usually referred to by economists as ‘externalities.’” STEPHEN BREYER, 
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groundwater are fully excludable from non-groundwater states. The 
same is not true for forests, which provide some non-excludable 
benefits – or positive externalities – and some spatially unbounded 
negative externalities. Despite their location within the territory of a 
single state, forests, as sinks for terrestrial carbon sequestration, are 
an open-access common pool resource and, as sources of greenhouse 
gas emissions create spillover effects with global scope.3 
Understanding the spatial extent of the externalities associated 
with a resource is an important first step in designing a regime to 
address the human/environment problems arising from that resource. 
Matching the spatial extent of the externalities with the spatial extent 
of the regime is part of finding the right “fit” and is one determinant 
of regime effectiveness.4 Although there are several elements of fit 
between a resource regime and the biogeophysical system it is meant 
to address, this essay deals only with identifying the appropriate 
international actors. In the international domain, the question is 
which states should (and which states should not) be included in the 
management of a particular resource pool. 
This essay contemplates the regime design question in the 
international domain – the domain in which states interact – and 
largely ignores the local domain, although it borrows concepts and 
terminology from local property and common-pool resource 
arrangements.5 In the process of scaling up and down between the 
 
REGULATION AND ITS REFORM 23 (1982). In theory, regulation would internalize the costs of 
negative externalities. See id. In this essay, externalities occur when costs or benefits associated 
with a resource “spillover” an international boundary; these are transnational externalities. A 
properly designed international resource regime would include only those actors required to 
internalize the externalities associated with that resource. 
 3. “Terrestrial carbon sequestration involves the net removal of CO2 from the atmosphere 
by plants during photosynthesis and its fixation in vegetative biomass and in soils.” U.S. DEP’T 
OF ENERGY & NAT’L ENERGY TECH. LAB., CARBON SEQUESTRATION ATLAS OF THE UNITED 
STATES AND CANADA 6 (2d ed. 2008), available at http://www.netl.doe.gov/technologies/ 
carbon_seq/refshelf/atlasII/atlasII.pdf. 
 4. The concept of fit, loosely applied in this essay, is borrowed from the institutional 
design literature. See, e.g., ORAN R. YOUNG, THE INSTITUTIONAL DIMENSIONS OF 
ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE: FIT, INTERPLAY, AND SCALE 55 (2002) (“[T]he effectiveness of 
environmental and resource regimes . . . is determined in considerable measure by the degree to 
which they are compatible with the biogeophysical systems with which they interact. . . . It 
follows that we should resist temptation to think that one size fits all when it comes to designing 
regimes to solve a variety of environmental problems.”). 
 5. I attribute my use of the word “domain” to the edited volume by Robert Keohane and 
Elinor Ostrom in which the authors explore some of the convergences of the common pool 
resource and international relations literatures that have grown out of these “two domains.” See 
LOCAL COMMONS AND GLOBAL INTERDEPENDENCE: HETEROGENEITY AND COOPERATION 
IN TWO DOMAINS (Robert O. Keohane & Elinor Ostrom eds., 1995). 
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two domains, one finds many analogs but most are not perfect 
matches; territorial sovereignty does not quite equal real property 
ownership. Moreover, some concepts or institutions found in one 
domain simply do not exist in the other; overarching state authority, 
an ever-present element in the local domain, is absent in the 
international domain. Thus, while borrowing between the two 
domains can be enlightening, it also has potential pitfalls. 
Despite what may seem like an obvious prediction – 
groundwater resource pools will be managed under bilateral or 
regional agreements among states in which those pools are located – 
there are some indications that groundwater is being misconceived as 
a commons resource subject to a regime with global scope. This 
misconception could lead to a misfit between the scope of the 
resource-related problems and the scope of the regime, particularly 
with regard to the number and identity of the actors involved.6 Such a 
mismatch could in turn contribute to regime ineffectiveness and 
inefficiency. 
I. UNPACKING THE GROUNDWATER RESOURCE 
The focus of this essay is on groundwater – water held in aquifers 
underground in the phreatic or saturated zone7 – as opposed to 
surface water (e.g. rivers and lakes). Still, much of this analysis is also 
applicable to surface water and other shared resources in several 
ways. First, groundwater, like most surface water, is located 
exclusively within the territory of sovereign states. Second, 
groundwater and surface water are often hydraulically connected 
such that dividing them into two separate resources, although 
 
 6. The goal of finding the right fit is to avoid a misfit. This essay is specifically concerned 
with avoiding a spatial misfit, which can occur when the “[i]nstitutional jurisdiction [is] too small 
or too large to cover or affect the areal extent of the ecosystem(s) subject to the institution.” 
Victor Galaz et al., The Problem of Fit among Biophysical Systems, Environmental and 
Resource Regimes, and Broader Governance Systems: Insights and Emerging Challenges, in 
INSTITUTIONS AND ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE: PRINCIPAL FINDINGS, APPLICATIONS AND 
RESEARCH FRONTIERS 147, 150 (Oran R. Young, Leslie A. King & Heike Schroeder eds., 
2008). 
 7. Aquifers are the “water-bearing layers of saturated underground rock and sand” while 
“the water in them is called groundwater.” JEFFREY S. ASHLEY & ZACHARY A. SMITH, 
GROUNDWATER MANAGEMENT IN THE WEST 5 (1999). The fact that groundwater moves 
within aquifers should not be misunderstood to mean aquifers are underground rivers. With the 
exception of “karst aquifers” which do resemble underground rivers, water flow in aquifers has 
been compared to the flow of water through a sponge. See Gabriel Eckstein & Yoram Eckstein, 
A Hydrogeological Approach to Transboundary Ground Water Resources and International 
Law, 19 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 201, 217 (2003). 
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convenient, does not conform to hydrological reality.8 Finally, ground 
and surface water are indistinguishable H2O from a hydrochemical 
perspective. Accordingly, these two parts of the freshwater resource 
base are also often considered together in international legal 
arrangements. Surface water has been the predominant concern, 
while groundwater has been addressed as a secondary issue in water-
specific treaties or as one of many concerns in boundary delimitation 
treaties.9 
This emphasis on surface water is curious considering the relative 
abundance of groundwater. If we exclude the vast amounts of 
freshwater held in polar ice and in glaciers,10 groundwater is by far the 
more abundant of the two remaining sources of freshwater – surface 
water and groundwater – comprising 97% of all freshwater available 
on the planet.11 Despite its relative abundance, the legal and policy 
issues associated with groundwater are not as well-studied, and the 
regimes governing its use in both the local and international domains 
are in their infancy compared to the longer-standing regimes 
addressing surface water.12 The reason for this state of relative neglect 
 
 8. Influent rivers replenish aquifers directly, and groundwater can discharge directly into 
effluent rivers, other aquifers and the ocean. Kerstin Mechlem, International Groundwater Law: 
Towards Closing the Gaps?, 14 Y.B. INT’L ENVTL. L. 47, 49 (2003); see also Eckstein & 
Eckstein, supra note 7, at 214-15. 
 9. See, e.g., Convention on the Law of the Non-navigational Uses of International 
Watercourses art. 2, May 21, 1997, 35 I.L.M. 700, 704 (not in force) (including most types of 
groundwater in the definition of “watercourse”); Albert E. Utton, The Development of 
International Groundwater Law, in INTERNATIONAL GROUNDWATER LAW 1, 10 (Ludwik A. 
Teclaff & Albert E. Utton eds., 1981) (“[G]roundwater is usually only a secondary issue which is 
mentioned almost in passing.”) [herinafter Utton, The Development]; Dante A. Caponera & 
Dominique Alhéritière, Principles for International Groundwater Law, in id. at 29-30 (discussing 
international land boundary delimitation treaties in which transboundary groundwater is 
considered); Mechlem, supra note 8, at 47 (“International law has only rarely taken account of 
groundwater.”). For the texts of agreements that address transboundary groundwater resource 
pools through approximately 1980, see Utton, The Development, supra, at 189. For the texts of 
agreements concluded since approximately 1980, see U.N. EDUC., SCIENTIFIC & CULTURAL 
ORG. [UNESCO] & FOOD AND AGRICULTURAL ORG. OF THE U.N. [FAO], FAO LEGISLATIVE 
STUDY NO. 86, GROUNDWATER IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: COMPILATION OF TREATIES AND 
OTHER LEGAL INSTRUMENTS (Stefano Burchi & Kerstin Mechlem eds., 2005). 
 10. Eckstein and Eckstein put the amount of freshwater held in ice caps, glaciers, ground 
ice, permafrost and perennial snow at approximately 70% of total freshwater stocks on the 
planet. Eckstein & Eckstein, supra note 7, at 204 fig. 1. 
 11. Int’l Law Comm’n, Seventh Report on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of 
International Watercourses, 52, U.N. Doc A/CN.4/436 (Mar. 15, 1991) (prepared by Stephen C. 
McCaffrey). 
 12. Utton, The Development, supra note 9, at 4 (“The laws governing groundwater 
nationally are inadequately developed, and the law governing transboundary groundwaters is 
only at the beginning state of development.”); Miguel Solanes, Institutional and Legal Issues 
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can be attributed to the invisibility of groundwater: out of sight, out of 
mind. 
This attitude toward groundwater appears to be changing. In 
2002, for example, the United Nations International Law Commission 
(ILC) decided to include the topic of “shared natural resources” in its 
program of work, the overall object of which is “the promotion of the 
progressive development of international law and its codification.”13 
At that time the ILC took up the task of preparing draft articles on 
the law of transboundary aquifers. The ILC drafting committee 
adopted the text of those draft articles on second reading in May 
2008.14 While the draft articles reflect some existing principles and 
customary rules of international law, the articles themselves have, to 
date, not been adopted by the United Nations General Assembly, are 
not in force, and do not create any new rights or obligations. 
Nonetheless, the draft articles will be considered below as both a 
possible source of misconception about the scope of the regime and, 
as the positive manifestation of United Nations member states’ 
perspectives on the issue, one yardstick against which to measure 
conclusions. 
In order to understand the characteristics of groundwater and 
the spatial extent of the externalities associated with its use, it is 
helpful to unpack the suite of goods and services the resource 
provides. Resources tend not to be monolithic in their functionality. 
Instead, they have multiple functionalities that, if not considered 
separately, could mask each other’s distinct characteristics and lead to 
a misconception of the biogeophysical system.15 
 
Relevant to the Implementation of Water Markets, in GROUNDWATER: LEGAL AND POLICY 
PERSPECTIVES: PROCEEDINGS OF A WORLD BANK SEMINAR, WORLD BANK TECHNICAL 
PAPER NO. 456, 69, 71 (Salman M. A. Salman ed., 1999) (“The evolution of groundwater law 
regarding ownership of this particular manifestation of water resources has been somehow 
slower than the evolution of surface water law.”). 
 13. Statute of the International Law Commission art. 1(1), G.A. Res. 174(II), at 105, U.N. 
Doc. A/519 (Nov. 21, 1947). 
 14. Int’l Law Comm’n [ILC], Shared Natural Resources: The law of transboundary aquifers, 
U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/L.724 (May 29, 2008). 
 15. Keohane and Ostrom demonstrate this point with respect to the rival or non-rival 
characteristic of two aspects of groundwater:  
Although this distinction is clear in the abstract, many physical resources 
can be viewed as public goods in regard to some aspects of their provision 
or use and as CPRs in regard to other aspects. Consider, for instance, the 
problem of managing a groundwater basin. In regard to appropriation or 
receiving benefits, the resource is clearly a common-pool resource – the 
water extracted by one user reduces the supply available to others. In 
regard to the regulation of the basin itself or its provision, protection of a 
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It may be helpful for the reader, who likely is more familiar with 
surface water, if only through casual observation, to make some 
comparisons between surface water and groundwater.16 Groundwater 
and surface water share many traits, but they also differ in important 
ways. Groundwater and surface water both exist on a continental 
scale, however, their distribution within the geography is markedly 
different. As a general observation, groundwater is more widely 
dispersed covering larger total areas, while surface water tends to be 
channeled and more restrictively bounded. Indeed, groundwater 
resource pools exist at such a large scale that many straddle not only 
local property or federal state boundaries, but also international 
boundaries, and, with the exception of remote islands, almost all 
states share groundwater resources with at least one neighbor.17 
Groundwater and surface water are both sources of water for 
municipal, agricultural, and industrial uses, however, due largely to 
their geographic distribution, the manner in which the two sources 
are accessed is quite different. Groundwater, at least in principle, is 
accessible to all inhabitants living above an aquifer through highly-
distributed, mostly private, low-intensity investments and unlike 
surface water does not require large public investment to extract, 
store or transport.18 Groundwater and surface water are also sinks of 
 
groundwater basin from salt-water intrusion, soil compaction or pollution is 
a public good because protection of one user against destruction of the 
basin also increases the supply of protection available to others.  
Robert O. Keohane & Elinor Ostrom, Introduction, in LOCAL COMMONS AND GLOBAL 
INTERDEPENDENCE: HETEROGENEITY AND COOPERATION IN TWO DOMAINS, supra note 5, at 
14. 
 16. Groundwater, especially groundwater found in “fossil” aquifers, may have more 
similarities to hydrocarbon deposits of oil and gas. These aquifers are non-recharging and hold 
water that may have been isolated from the hydrologic cycle for thousands if not millions of 
years. Eckstein & Eckstein, supra note 7, at 216-17. They do not experience flow and are “de-
coupled from contemporary recharge.” Jacob Burke et al., Groundwater and Society: Problems 
in Variability and Points of Engagement, in GROUNDWATER: LEGAL AND POLICY 
PERSPECTIVES, supra note 12, at 31, 36. It is possible that the sharing and management of these 
resources could benefit from the oil and gas model in both the local and international domains. 
 17. Robert Glennon et al., Turning on the Tap: The World’s Water Problems, 3 FRONTIERS 
IN ECOLOGY AND THE ENVIRONMENT 503, 504 (2005); Caponera & Alhéritière, supra note 9, at 
26. 
 18. See Burke et al., supra note 16, at 32. (noting the differences between groundwater and 
surface water in the socioeconomic context); Shammy Puri, Alice Aureli & Raya M. Stephan, 
Shared Groundwater Resources: Global Significance for Social and Environmental 
Sustainability, in OVEREXPLOITATION AND CONTAMINATION OF SHARED GROUNDWATER 
RESOURCES 3, 7 (C.J.G. Darnault ed., 2008). It is this close spatial relationship between 
groundwater users and the resource that inspires comments such as “Groundwater is a local 
resource par excellence,” id., and “Groundwater is above all else a vicinity resource.”  
UNESCO, INT’L HYDROLOGICAL PROGRAMME [IHP], GROUNDWATER RESOURCES OF THE 
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pollution. In this role their main difference is their ability to recover 
from overexploitation, pollution of groundwater often resulting in 
irreversible damage as the “self-purifying qualities” of groundwater 
and aquifers are less effective than those of surface water.19 
Groundwater and surface water both flow,20 however, 
groundwater flows at a much slower rate, can flow vertically as well as 
horizontally,21 and flow direction and rate can be influenced by 
pumping. One of the most important political consequences of flow in 
surface water – the creation of upper and lower riparians – is more 
complex when it comes to groundwater. In the international domain, 
these factors are relevant because groundwater flow can, under some 
conditions, create an upstream/downstream relationship between 
sharing states.22 Often, however, the direction of flow is not uniform, 
does not always flow toward a common terminus, can connect 
otherwise unrelated river basins, and is difficult to detect. Moreover, 
the impacts of its use as a source or a sink can cause effects 
throughout the resource pool, with pollution traveling in all directions 
from the point of contamination and the water table dropping 
throughout the aquifer as a result of overdrafting.23 Under these flow 
conditions hydrological “blowback” is a real possibility with 
groundwater. 
Finally, groundwater and surface water are both renewable, yet 
the rates at which they are renewed through natural recharge can 
vary dramatically. Surface water renews through the direct effects of 
precipitation on a daily, weekly, or monthly time scale. By contrast, 
groundwater renews on a monthly to millennial time scale through 
 
WORLD AND THEIR USE 24 (Igor S. Zekster & Lome G. Everett eds., 2004), available at http:// 
unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0013/001344/134433e.pdf. 
 19. Mechlem, supra note 8, at 58 (2003); see also Burke et al., supra note 16, at 40 (noting 
the technical impossibility or economic infeasibility of cleaning up an aquifer once polluted). 
 20. With the exception of groundwater in fully confined, “fossil” aquifers, groundwater 
does flow through aquifers. 
 21. Stephen Foster, Essential Concepts for Groundwater Regulators, in GROUNDWATER: 
LEGAL AND POLICY PERSPECTIVES, supra note 12, at 15, 16 (noting predominantly horizontal 
flow). 
 22. See, e.g., Eckstein & Eckstein, supra note 7, at 213-14 (describing the hydrogeology of 
the mixed confined-unconfined Mountain, or West Bank, Aquifer that recharges only in the 
unconfined portion located in the Judean Mountains of the West Bank and flows toward the 
confined portion in Israel); M. El-Fadel, R. Quba’a, N. El-Hougeiri, Z. Hashisho & D. Jamali, 
The Israeli Palestinian Mountain Aquifer: A Case Study in Ground Water Conflict Resolution, 30 
J. NAT. RESOURCES & LIFE SCI. EDUC. 50 (2001) (providing a detailed case study of this 
transboundary aquifer). 
 23. See Mechlem, supra note 8 (discussing some of the physical characteristics of 
groundwater). 
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the less direct effects of surface water and precipitation percolating 
through the unsaturated zone. Slower rates of groundwater recharge 
are both a strength and weakness of groundwater: groundwater is 
more vulnerable to overdrafting, but it can also be a more reliable 
source of water since it is relatively immune to seasonal fluctuations 
in precipitation. 
The spatial externalities associated with the use of groundwater 
are bounded, more or less, by the aquifer system in which the 
particular groundwater resource pool is located. Although pollution 
can flow out of an aquifer into hydraulically connected surface water, 
and overdrafting can have negative effects on the flow of connected 
surface water and the stability of the overlying land, the scope of 
these effects is regional, not global. Because the hydrologic cycle will 
be impacted by climate change, climate change and related water 
issues are sometimes considered together.24 Although connected, the 
human/environment problems of water on the one hand, and climate 
change on the other, are quite different, especially in scope. With 
respect to the climate puzzle in which greenhouse gas emissions, the 
atmosphere, and forests are all directly involved, groundwater is an 
innocent bystander.25 Groundwater is neither part of the climate 
change problem – groundwater is not a source of greenhouse gas 
emissions – nor part of its solution – it does not act as a carbon sink as 
forests do.26 Although climate models predict an increase in overall 
 
 24. See, e.g., Symposium, Local Property, Global Justice: Law and Resources in the Era of 
Climate Change, 19 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. (forthcoming 2009) (consisting of three panels on 
greenhouse gas emissions, forests, and water). 
 25. In this sense groundwater stands in the same place relative to the climate puzzle as sea 
level rise. Scarce groundwater and rising sea levels do not contribute to the problem or to the 
solution of climate change, but are directly affected by the changing climate. Of course the truly 
innocent bystanders are those who rely on groundwater to survive in areas where it will become 
increasingly scarce as a result of changes in climate, or those living in low lying coastal areas that 
might soon be inundated. 
 26. Groundwater is not without links to climate change, however it is not directly involved 
in the processes. 
       Groundwater does not emit greenhouse gases. However, its extraction often requires 
pumping which can involve the use of greenhouse gas emitting processes. Biswas notes that 
“[t]he linkages between groundwater and energy requirements are high. . . . Estimates . . . 
indicate that 12%-13% of all electricity generated in Mexico is used to pump water up and 
down.” Asit Biswas, Water Crisis: Current Perceptions and Future Realities, in GROUNDWATER: 
LEGAL AND POLICY PERSPECTIVES, supra note 12, at 1, 9. 
        Groundwater is not a carbon sink. However, it is used to irrigate vegetation that in turn acts 
as a carbon sink. The vegetation in wetlands, which require the presence of surface water (and 
in some cases groundwater) make substantial contributions to the carbon sequestration process. 
Groundwater does have a sink functionality in the sense that it absorbs pollution, but most of 
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precipitation globally, the spatial and temporal distribution of this 
increased precipitation will not lead to increased groundwater 
recharge in those regions most in need of it.27 In some regions 
groundwater could become scarcer as a result of climate change, 
especially in already arid, low- or mid-latitude regions.28 In arid 
regions major aquifer recharge episodes are already rare, occurring 
“as infrequently as once a decade, or even once a century.”29 Reduced 
precipitation could have a multiplicative effect on groundwater 
recharge. Indeed, one recent MIT study found that “a 20 percent 
decrease in rainfall could lead to a 70 percent decrease in the 
recharging of local aquifers.”30 
II. A TAXONOMY OF INTERNATIONAL RESOURCES 
Scholars of collective action and common-pool resource 
arrangements differentiate types of goods and services on the basis of 
their rivalness and their excludability.31 Unfortunately, most of the 
 
this pollution attenuation functionality can be attributed to the soil and sediment of the 
unsaturated, or vadose zone through which groundwater percolates. 
        Finally, it seems conceivable that certain deep and fully confined aquifers could be used for 
future geologic carbon sequestration, although that use is not currently being pursued in the 
United States. “Geologic carbon sequestration involves the separation and capture of CO2 at 
the point of emissions from stationary sources followed by storage in deep underground 
geologic formations.” 2008 Carbon Sequestration Atlas of the United States and Canada, supra 
note 3, at 6. 
 27. See GROUNDWATER RESOURCES OF THE WORLD AND THEIR USE, supra note 18, at 
285 (discussing the limitations of general circulation models to predict changes at a regional 
scale). 
 28. See Isamu Kayane, Global Warming and Groundwater Resources in Arid Lands, in 
FRESHWATER RESOURCES IN ARID LANDS, UNU GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL FORUM V 70 
(Juha I. Uitto & Jutta Schneider eds., 1997) (discussing indirect influence of global warming on 
local precipitation). 
 29. Stephen Foster, supra note 21, at 15, 23. 
 30. David Chandler, Water Supplies could be strongly affected by climate change, MIT 
NEWS, Dec. 18, 2008, http://web.mit.edu/newsoffice/2008/agu-groundwater-1218.html. 
       The same MIT study indicates a disproportionately large recharge effect with only small 
increases in precipitation, which is not good news for areas plagued with an overabundance of 
groundwater. This article assumes scarcity or underprovision of the goods and services 
associated with the groundwater resource, although it is possible that some regions will 
experience an overabundance of groundwater as a result of changing patterns of precipitation. 
An overabundance of groundwater would create flooding. Combined with predicted sea level 
rise and intensified storm events, this could create serious problems in low-lying coastal areas. 
 31. Dichotomizing these two variables into rival/non-rival (or subtractibility) and 
excludable/non-excludable we can differentiate between private goods (rival/excludable), pure 
public goods (non-rival/non-excludable), club goods (non-rival/excludable), and common pool 
resources (rival/non-excludable). The last of these types poses the problems associated with the 
tragedy of the commons. See Oran R. Young, Rights, Rules, and Common Pools: Solving 
Problems Arising in Human/Environment Relations, 47 NAT. RESOURCES J., 1, 3 fig.1 (2007). 
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goods and services provided by the limited natural resources of our 
planet – including water, land, fish, and the sink functionalities of our 
air, atmosphere, stratospheric ozone, forests and water – are rival, 
such that the use of a good or service by one reduces the availability 
of that good or service to others. Although these resources do not 
vary in terms of their rivalness, they do vary markedly in the level of 
excludability. For the purpose of understanding the appropriate scope 
of a regime or the spatial extent of the externalities associated with a 
resource, excludability is the more useful variable. The ability or right 
to exclude is also an element in the traditional bundle of local 
property rights and excludability goes directly to the question of 
relevant actors. In the context of finding the right fit, the relevant 
actors are those who have access to the goods and services provided 
by the resource or who experience the externalities of its use.32 
A three-class taxonomy of resources in the international domain 
dependent entirely on the excludability variable could be a useful tool 
for understanding the appropriate scope of the related regime. 
Positioning within this taxonomy will shed light on the spatial extent 
of the externalities of the resource and therefore, who should be 
considered in the management of the resource. It should be noted 
that the physical location of the resource is not important to this 
taxonomy, but rather what are the number and identities of the actors 
who are impacted by or enjoy the externalities associated with the 
resource. The three classes are (1) sovereign resources (fully 
excludable); (2) shared resources (partially excludable); (3) commons 
resources (non-excludable). 
A. Sovereign Resources 
Sovereign resources are located wholly within the territory of a 
single state, the goods and services of the resource are fully 
excludable to those beyond the territory of that state, and the 
externalities associated with the use of the resource do not spill over 
 
Non-rivalness is also referred to as jointness. See MANCUR OLSON JR., THE LOGIC OF 
COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE THEORY OF GROUPS 14 n.21 (rev. ed. 1971).   
However, Ostrom cautions against confusing rivalness of resource units with jointness of a 
resource system. ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS: THE EVOLUTION OF 
INSTITUTIONS FOR COLLECTIVE ACTION 32 (1990). 
 32. “Excludability” is often used to mean keeping potential users from goods or services, 
which I have equated with positive externalities in this essay. Here, “excludability,” is also used 
to draw the line between those who are and those who are not impacted by “bads” or negative 
externalities. 
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the territorial boundaries of the resource state.33 In general, the 
resources controlled by a sovereign state include those on the surface, 
in the airspace (ad coelum) and those in the subsoil (ad inferos) of the 
territory.34 For coastal states, sovereign territory also generates 
sovereign rights over the natural resources of the water column, 
seabed and subsoil of the exclusive economic zone.35 A coal deposit or 
biological resource located entirely within the territory of a single 
state would fall into this category of sovereign resources.36 Such 
sovereign resources, being fully excludable, are private goods. Their 
‘ownership’ structure most closely resembles private property: a 
single rights-holder with a complete bundle of sticks that is subject 
only to the omni-present rule of property ownership sic utere tuo ut 
alienum non laedas (use your own so as not to injure another). 
Because this limiting rule is only activated in the event of spillover, its 
activation necessarily changes the resource from a sovereign resource 
into one of the other two types; shared resource or commons 
resource. 
B. Shared Resources 
Shared resources are those subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of 
two or more states. These are excludable for non-members but non-
excludable within the group of sharing states since there is spillover 
among a limited subset of all states. In other words, the spatial extent 
of the externalities may be regional, but is not global. Shared 
resources, being only partially excludable, are limited-access common 
pool resources – a form of collective good. Their ‘ownership’ 
structure most closely resembles common property with some duties 
 
 33. These are also referred to as “internal resources.” See, e.g., Eyal Benvenisti, Collective 
Action in the Utilization of Shared Freshwater: The Challenges of International Water Resources 
Law, 90 AM. J. INT’L L. 384, 384 (1996). Specifically with respect to groundwater found within 
the exclusive jurisdiction of a single state, one author has coined the term “State-owned 
aquifers.” Julio Barberis, The Development of International Law of Transboundary 
Groundwater, 31 NAT. RESOURCES J. 167, 167 (1991). This term, which was developed to 
describe the resource in the international domain, could confuse if misapplied in the local 
domain where it would imply state or public as opposed to private ownership of the resource. 
 34. See Rainer Lagoni, Oil and Gas Deposits across National Frontiers, 73 AM. J. INT’L L. 
215, 216 (1979) (ad inferos with respect to mineral resources). 
 35. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea art. 56(1)(a), Nov. 16, 1994, 18 
U.N.T.S. 3. 
 36. The latter despite the perambulatory affirmation that “biological diversity is a common 
concern of humankind.” Convention on Biological Diversity pmbl., entered into force Dec. 29, 
1993, 1760 U.N.T.S. 79 (emphasis added). 
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owed from one rights holder to another.37 In the international domain 
many of these duties may not rise to the status of binding obligations, 
but they would at least define standards of good behavior and might 
include good neighborliness, a general obligation to cooperate, the 
principles of information and consultation, environmental impact 
assessment procedures, and the principle of non-discrimination.38 
Some resources in this category include hydrocarbon deposits that 
straddle an international boundary and shared fish resources found 
within the exclusive economic zones of two or more countries. 
Transboundary airsheds and watersheds would also qualify as shared 
resources. The question of how, exactly, these transboundary 
resources are to be shared – both in terms of allocating the benefits 
and mitigating or compensating for the negative externalities 
associated with the resource – is one for the sharing states to 
determine by agreement within the strictures of any overarching 
international law rules and obligations. At a minimum, sharing states 
are bound by the customary rule against allowing activities within 
their territory to cause significant harm in the territory of another 
state.39 It is also argued that “equitable utilization” is the customary 
international law sharing rule for shared resources creating binding, if 
vague, obligations for sharing states.40 
 
 37. At the outset of the ILC’s work on “shared natural resources,” member states were 
careful to distinguish between shared ownership, an idea some were resistant to, and shared 
responsibility for resource management, which was the understanding of “shared” adopted by 
the Special Rapporteur. See Int’l Law Comm’n [ILC], Report of the Commission at the Fifty-
Eight Session, ch. 9, ¶403, supplement no. 10 (A/58/10) (2006). 
 38. See Pierre-Marie Dupuy, Soft Law and the International Law of the Environment, 12 
MICH. J. INT’L L. 420, 434 (1991) (describing the role of “soft” international environmental law 
norms in describing standards of behavior for states). 
 39. This rule is considered by most to be a binding rule of customary international law, one 
of the only of its kind in the field of international environmental law. There seems to be some 
agreement that this limiting rule, expressed in Principle 2 of the Rio Declaration, has achieved 
the status of customary international law. See, e.g., PETER MALANCZUK, AKEHURST’S 
MODERN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 250 (7th ed. 1997) (“Principle 2 [of the Rio 
Declaration] confirms the prohibition of transboundary environmental harm . . . which is now 
recognized as customary law reflecting the principle of limited territorial sovereignty and 
integrity . . . .”). 
 40. Malgosia Fitzmaurice, General Principles Governing the Cooperation between States in 
Relation to Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses, 14 Y.B. INT’L ENVTL. L. 3, 10 
(2003); see also Julio Barberis, The Development of International Law of Transboundary 
Groundwater, 31 NAT. RESOURCES J. 167, 175 (1991) (“The rule [of equitable utilization] enjoys 
wide acceptance today and is part of general international law.”); Eyal Benvenisti, Collective 
Action in the Utilization of Shared Freshwater: The Challenges of International Water Resources 
Law, 90 AM. J. INT’L L, 384, 414 (1996) (“[T]he vague standard [of equitable use] increases the 
likelihood of cooperation by encouraging riparians to negotiate rather than litigate. . . .”). 
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C. Commons Resources 
Commons resources typically exist in an area of the “global 
commons” – those areas beyond the limit of national jurisdiction of 
any state – such as the living marine resources outside the exclusive 
economic zone, the stratospheric ozone layer, and, at least for now, 
Antarctica. But the location of the resource is not the determining 
factor in this taxonomy; rather, it is whether the benefits of the goods 
and services supplied by the resource can be accessed by all users or 
whether the negative externalities associated with the resource have 
global reach. Commons resources, being non-excludable, are open-
access, common-pool resources. Because they are typically rival in 
nature, commons resources are not pure public goods, although they 
are sometimes referred to as public goods.41 Within commons 
resources there are two distinct subtypes: res nullius the ownership 
structure of which resembles null property subject to the rule of 
capture, and common heritage of humankind resources, which 
resemble public property in that these resources may not be 
appropriated through capture and are normally subject to 
international management. 
In the interest of effective regime design, and with proper fit in 
mind, it is clear that the position of a resource in this taxonomy 
should drive the scope of the regime intended to address problems 
associated with that resource. A wholly internal, sovereign resource, 
for instance, will need no international resource regime, as all of the 
problems associated with the resource will be internal to the state in 
which the resource is located. On the other hand, a commons 
resource will require a regime that includes all states, that is, a regime 
of global scope. Forests as sources and sinks of greenhouse gases with 
global spillover effects and total non-excludability are positioned 
squarely within the commons resource classification and, thus, are a 
prime example of resources that require a regime of global scope. 
Regimes designed to address shared resources fall in the middle of 
these extremes, requiring the participation of sharing states only. 
Groundwater, whose externalities are spatially bounded and which is 
excludable to non-groundwater states, is a shared resource requiring a 
 
 41. See OSTROM, supra note 31, at 32-33 (distinguishing between common pool resources 
on the one hand and collective or public goods on the other); see also OLSON, supra note 31, at 
14-15 (using “common,” “collective,” and “public goods” interchangeably to describe a non-
rival good within a limited group of users); Benvenisti, supra note 40 at 384 (referring to public 
goods as those “to which all states enjoy potentially unrestricted access” and distinguishing from 
a “collective good to which only the riparian states enjoy access”). 
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regime with a more limited scope: involving only the particular 
groundwater states. To apply a regime of global scope to problems 
associated with shared resources would create an unhelpful and 
unnecessary mismatch. 
The emerging international law regimes for forests, in the 
context of climate change, and for shared groundwater tend to 
confirm these classifications. The Kyoto Protocol to the United 
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change is part of a 
regime of global scope designed to achieve the “stabilization of 
greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that 
would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate 
system.”42 Forests as sources and sinks of greenhouse gases are 
explicitly included within the accounting scheme created under the 
Kyoto Protocol and subsequent agreements within the climate change 
regime.43 In contrast, the emerging transboundary groundwater 
regime contemplates only bilateral or regional agreements or 
arrangements for the management of particular shared resource 
pools.44 
III. THE MISCONCEPTION OF GROUNDWATER AS A 
COMMONS RESOURCE
There are some indications in the academic literature and in the 
record of multilateral law-making negotiations that groundwater is 
being misconceived as a commons resource. There are several 
possible sources of this misconception; some originate in the 
international domain, others in the local domain. If fit is an important 
 
 42. United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change art. 2, May 9, 1992, 1771 
U.N.T.S. 107. 
 43. Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change art. 
3 ¶ 3, Dec. 11, 1997, U.N. Doc FCCC/CP/1997/7/Add. 1 (“The net changes in greenhouse gas 
emissions by sources and removal by sinks resulting from direct human-induced land-use change 
and forestry activities, limited to afforestation, reforestation and deforestation since 1990 . . . 
shall be used to meet the commitments under this Article of each Party included in Annex I.”).  
        At the sixth session of the Conference of the Parties (part two) in Bonn the Parties 
expanded on the principles governing forestry activities within the climate change regime. 
Framework Convention on Climate Change, Bonn, June 16-27, 2001, Review of the 
Implementation of Commitments and of Other Provisions of the Convention, Annex VII, U.N. 
Doc FCCC/CP/2001/L.7 (July 24, 2001). 
 44. Int’l Law Comm’n [ILC], Draft Articles on the Law of Transboundary Aquifers, art. 9, 
U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/L.724 (May 29, 2008) (“For the purpose of managing a particular 
transboundary aquifer or aquifer system, aquifer States are encouraged to enter into bilateral or 
regional agreements or arrangements among themselves.”). 
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determinant of regime effectiveness, the misconception must be 
dispelled. 
It is undeniable that international environmental problems pose 
a challenge to “the traditional notion of national sovereignty that 
states may do whatever they please within their own territory.”45 This 
tension between absolute territorial sovereignty and international 
environmental problems can be restated: notions of absolute 
territorial sovereignty pose a major obstacle to the solution of some 
international environmental problems. In fact, this tension has put 
absolute territorial sovereignty under pressure for more than a 
century, and has resulted in a widely-recognized rule of customary 
international law that limits or constrains absolute territorial 
sovereignty, one of the more recent verbalizations of which is found 
in Principle 2 of the 1992 Rio Declaration: 
States have, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations 
and the principles of international law, the sovereign right to 
exploit their own resources pursuant to their own environmental 
and have the responsibility to ensure that activities within 
their jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to the 
environment of other States or of areas beyond the limits of 
national jurisdiction.46 
Principle 2 of the Rio Declaration is little more than a 
restatement of a long-standing rule of customary international law.47 
Nonetheless, relatively new realizations about the far-reaching affect 
of human activities on the environment have brought new attention 
to the transboundary, and in some cases global, scope of activities 
carried out within the territory of a sovereign state, the broader 
relevance of the obligations embodied in Principle 2, and the duty 
owed to a growing number of actors beyond the territory of 
individual sovereign states. 
But the modern international law view of constrained or limited 
sovereignty does not equate to an absence of sovereignty. Indeed, 
 
 45. David Freestone, 
,  GROUNDWATER: LEGAL AND POLICY PERSPECTIVES,  
note 12, at 191-92 (citing Gunther Handl, 
, 1 Y.B. INT’L ENVTL. L. 3, 32 (1990)). 
 46. U.N. Conference on Env’t and Dev., June 3-14, 1992, 
, Rio de Janeiro, princ. 1, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.151/26/Rev.1/Vol.1 (1992) 
(emphasis added).  This language is identical to Principle 21 of the 1972 Stockholm Declaration 
except “and developmental” was added to Rio. See 
 (“Stockholm Declaration”), Stockholm, June 5-16, 
1972, princ. 21, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.48/14/Rev.1 (1973). 
47 ., Trail Smelter Case (U.S. v. Can.), 3 R. Int’l Abr. Awards 1905 (1941). 
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real obligations to neighboring states with respect to shared resources 
do not equate to obligations owed erga omnes to all states irrespective 
of their relationship to the resource in question. Nonetheless, well-
respected scholars make statements that appear to be based on just 
these false equations. With respect to groundwater in particular one 
author writes: 
Exploitation of scarce, transboundary groundwater resources can 
no longer be seen as an issue exclusively within the jurisdiction of 
the State under the territory of which these resources extend. For 
the vast continental groundwater resources . . . there can be argued 
to be obligations owed erga omnes resources of 
international concern
all states have a legal interest
tor noted that “[t]hroughout much of the debate leading to 
the Draft Articles, numerous Members of the [ILC] and of the Sixth 
Committee opined that permanent sovereignty over natural resources 
was central to the subject matter and must be recognized in the Draft 
 





supra quoting International Law and the 
Protection of the Global Atmosphere: Concepts, Categories and Principles in
Second Report on Shared Natural Resources: Transboundary 
Groundwater prepared by
Commentary on the U.N. International Law Commission’s Draft 
Articles on the Law of Transboundary Aquifers




 . See The Problem of Water
per, http://www.u.artizona.edu/~libecap/downloads/TheProblemOfWater.pdf) (comparing the 
resource characteristics of land, fresh water and wild-ocean fish stocks, and concluding that the 
challenges of defining property rights in water is more like the challenges associated with fish 
than with land.); Stephen Foster, Essential Concepts for Groundwater Regulators, in 
GROUNDWATER: LEGAL AND POLICY PERSPECTIVES, supra note 12, at 21 (“Groundwaters 
LATHROP_FMT2.DOC 5/7/2009  2:40:54 PM 
430 DUKE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE & INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol 19:413 
in the international domain is non-excludable in the local domain. 
Scaling-up to the international domain, the number of ‘owners’ is 
reduced by many orders of magnitude, and the natural boundaries of 
the resource no longer far outstrip the artificial territorial boundaries 
of its users. 
Second, in the local domain, the problem with water is typically 
described as one in which private property interests thwart the 
management of a common pool resource.56 This relationship is flipped 
when viewed at the international scale, where the concern is 
misconceiving groundwater as a commons resource when in fact it is a 
sovereign resource similar to private property, or at most a shared 
resource similar to common property jointly owned by a small group. 
Third, in some national systems the state owns the groundwater 
resources of the nation, such that groundwater is in the public domain 
and not owned privately, appurtenant to land ownership or 
otherwise.57 Yet, the international domain does not have an analog to 
the public domain in areas otherwise subject to the exclusive 
jurisdiction and control of a sovereign state. The common heritage of 
humankind concept is the closest equivalent, but has only been 
applied to resources and areas beyond national jurisdiction. 
The first two examples are entirely a function of scale and the 
changes that occur in the relationship between the spatial extent of 
the resource and the spatial extent of the actors involved in its use. 
The third example demonstrates that local institutions do not 
necessarily have international counterparts. All three examples 
demonstrate that borrowing across the two domains – applying local 
property and common pool resource concepts and lessons to similar 
problems in the international domain – can be useful but should be 
done cautiously. 
CONCLUSION 
A regime intended to manage the use of a particular 
groundwater resource pool as either a source of water or a sink for 
 
(like fish) are a resource for which property rights are not obviously defined in the legal 
sense.”). 
 56. Jacob Burke, Marcus Moench & Claude Sauveplane, Groundwater and Society: 
Problems in Variability and Points of Engagement, in GROUNDWATER: LEGAL AND POLICY 
PERSPECTIVES, supra note 12, at 49 (“[C]ontrol over abstraction and protection of the resource 
base continues to be thwarted by the perception and treatment of groundwater as a private 
resource – despite the evident common pool properties of groundwater.”). 
 57. Solanes, supra note 12, at 70 (“Most systems of water law explicitly include water 
within the public domain of the state, the people or the nation.”). 
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pollution need not be global in scope; rather, the spatial extent of the 
regime should match the spatial extent of the externalities associated 
with the resource. Beyond that scope users can be excluded from the 
benefits of the resource, are not subject to its negative externalities, 
and should be excluded from the regime designed to manage the 
resource. The ILC draft articles on the law of transboundary aquifers 
and the limited amount of state practice that exists both indicate that 
the international groundwater resource regime is heading in this 
direction. 
This is the international groundwater resource regime as it is 
currently developing: the lex lata
Rights, Rules, and Common Pools: Solving Problems Arising in 
Human/Environment Relations
